Republic of the Philippines
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND INQUIRY BOARD

FINAL REPORT

RP-C4321
PIPER AIRCRAFT INC.
PA-23-250

OPERATOR: FLITELINE AIRWAYS PHILS. INC.

TYPE OF OPERATION: COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: AUGUST 28, 2025

PLACE OF OCCURRENCE: JORGE ABAD AIRPORT, ITBAYAT, BATANES, PHILIPPINES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(Piper Aircraft Inc., PA-23-250, RP-C4321 Final Report)

FOREWORD

This report was produced by the Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (AAIIB), Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines, MIA Road, Pasay City, Philippines.

The report is based upon the investigation carried out by the AAIIB in accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Republic Act 9497 Section 42, and Philippine Civil Aviation Regulation Part 13.

Readers are advised that the AAIIB investigates for the sole purpose of enhancing aviation safety. Consequently, AAIIB reports are confined to matters of safety significance and may be misleading if used for any other purpose. It should be noted that the information in AAIIB reports and recommendations is provided to promote aviation safety, and in no case is it intended to imply blame or liability.

Furthermore, no part of the AAIIB report or reports relating to any accident or investigation shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports.

FINAL REPORT

TITLE: Serious Incident involving a PA-23-250 type of aircraft with Registry Number RP-C4321 sustained damage on both propellers following a runway overrun at runway 36, Jorge Abad Airport, Itbayat, Batanes Philippines, on August 28, 2025/1330H

Notification of Occurrence to National Authority

The Notification of serious incident was reported to the CAAP Operations Center, which relayed the information to the CAAP AAIIB on August 30, 2025.

Identification of the Investigation Authority

The Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (AAIIB), the mandated accident investigation organization within the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) as the state of Occurrence/Registry/ Operator conducted the investigation.

Organization of the Investigation

In accordance with provisions of Philippine Civil Aviation Regulation (PCAR) Part 13, an Investigator-In-Charge was appointed.

Authority Releasing the Report

The Final investigation report was released by Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (AAIIB) and published on the CAAP website on **November 27, 2025**.

Synopsis:

On or about 1330H, August 28, 2025, a PA-23-250 type of aircraft with Registry Number RP-C4321, operated by Fliteline Airways Phils, Inc. had a runway overrun at Jorge Abad Airport (RPLT), Itbayat, Batanes, Philippines. The Pilot with five (5) passengers on board were not injured and the aircraft sustained minor damage on its propeller. Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed on the time of occurrence. The cause of the occurrence was attributed to the pilot's unable to bring the aircraft to a complete stop within the available runway length resulting in a runway overrun.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAIIB	:	Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board
AMO	:	Approved Maintenance Organization
CAAP	:	Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
CPL	:	Commercial Pilot License
LCD	:	Licensing and Certification Department
L/H	:	Left Hand
OFSAM	:	Flight Surgeon and Aviation Medicine
PCAR	:	Philippine Civil Aviation Regulation
R/H	:	Right Hand
VFR	:	Visual Flight Rules
VHF	:	Very High Frequency
VMC	:	Visual Meteorological Conditions

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

Aircraft Registration No.	:	RP- C4321
Aircraft Manufacturer /Model	:	Piper Aircraft Inc./PA-23-250
Operator	:	Fliteline Airways Phils, Inc.
Address of Operator	:	1513 Metrica St, Sampaloc Manila
Place of Occurrence	:	Jorge Abad Airport, Itbayat, Batanes Philippines
Date/Time of Occurrence	:	August 28, 2025/1330H/0530 UTC
Type of Operation	:	Commercial Air Transport
Phase of Flight	:	Landing
Type of Occurrence	:	Aircraft Overrun

1.1 History of the Flight

On or about 1330H, August 28, 2025, a PA-23-250 type of aircraft with Registry Number RP-C4321, operated by Fliteline Airways Phils, Inc., had a runway overrun at Jorge Abad Airport (RPLT), Itbayat, Batanes, Philippines. The pilot and five (5) passengers on board were not injured, and the aircraft sustained minor damage to its propeller. The pilot was on his fifth (5th) leg to Itbayat, Batanes, after departing from Basco Airport (RPUO), Basco, Batanes. Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of occurrence, and a local flight plan had been filed.

The pilot reported a loss of brakes while on a landing roll at RWY 36 of the RPLT. The aircraft made an overrun and came to a full stop 20 meters from the end of the runway with grid coordinates of 20° 43°38'N; 121°48'35"E. Airport personnel immediately responded to assist the aircraft occupants. The responders found the occupants with seat belts still fastened and the aircraft wheels partially embedded in mud. The pilot and passengers were assisted in disembarking the aircraft normally. The aircraft was

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repositioned to the concrete portion of the runway and taxied back to the ramp (Figure 1).

Figure 1 - RP-C4321 repositioned from the soft ground to the concrete pavement of the runway.

1.2 Injuries to Person (s)

1.2.1 The lone pilot on-board the helicopter was fatally injured.

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others
Fatal	0	0	0
Serious	0	0	0
Minor	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	0	0

1.3 Damage to Aircraft

The aircraft sustained minor damage on both propellers.

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1.4 Personnel Information

1.4.1 Pilot

Gender	:	Male
Date of Birth	:	August 09, 1975
Nationality	:	Filipino
License	:	144605- CPL/FI/GI
Valid up to	:	May 14, 2030
Type rating	:	Airplane: Single and Multi-Engine-Land-Instrument- C152, C172, C182, BE55, PA23-250, PA23-200
Medical Certificate Valid until	:	Valid until February 19, 2026
Total Flying Time	:	5,004 +25 Hours
Total Flying Time On type	:	746 + 00 Hours

1.5 Aircraft Information

1.5.1 Aircraft Data

Registration Mark	:	RP- C4321
Manufacturer	:	Piper Aircraft Inc.
Country of Manufacturer	:	USA
Type/Model	:	PA-23-250
Operator	:	Fliteline Airways Phils, Inc.
Serial Number	:	27-4624
Date of Manufactured	:	1971
Certificate of Airworthiness valid up to	:	January 25, 2026
Certificate of Registration valid up to	:	August 05, 2029
Number of Flight Crew	:	1
Number of Passenger	:	5
Airframe total time	:	7,393+15 Hours since last C of A

1.5.2 Engine Data

Manufacturer	:	Lycoming
Type/Model	:	IO-540-C4B5
Engine Serial Number	:	L-8482-4B, L-10660-48
Time Between Overhaul	:	2,000 hours
Time Since Overhaul	:	666+17 hours, 515+49 hours

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1.5.3 Propeller Data

Manufacturer	:	Hartzell
Type/Model	:	HC-E2Y-2RBSF
Propeller Serial Number	:	BP3759, BP10200B
Time Between Overhaul	:	2,000 hours
Time Since Overhaul	:	000+00 hours, 563+50 hours
Time Since New	:	66+17 hours, 3,383+14 hours

1.6 Meteorological Information

The wind condition was 090 at 10 knots, gusting 19 knots.

1.7 Aids to Navigation

The flight was conducted through Visual Flight Rules (VFR). VFR are set of regulations under which a pilot operates an aircraft in weather conditions generally clear enough to allow the pilot to see visual ground references and where the aircraft is going.

1.8 Communications

The aircraft was equipped with operational Very High Frequency (VHF) transceiver used for communicating with aerodrome personnel and pilots in the area.

1.9 Aerodrome Information

1.9.1 General Information

Aerodrome Name	:	Itbayat Community Airport
Coordinates	:	20.47N 121.50E.
Aerodrome Operator	:	Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
Runway Direction	:	18 /36
Runway Length	:	801M
Runway Width	:	18 meters
Runway Elevation	:	94 meters
Surface	:	Concrete
Types of traffic permitted	:	VFR
Visual Ground Aids	:	Standard day markers and wind direction indicator

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Runway (RWY) markings	:	RWY designation markings, threshold markings, Touchdown zone markings, RWY side stripes, Aiming points.

1.10 Flight Recorders

The aircraft was not equipped with any flight recorders and existing Philippine Civil Aviation Regulation does not require it.

1.11 Test and Research

After completing the on-site documentation at the site, company maintenance personnel, under the supervision of the CAAP AAIIB Investigator, conducted an inspection of brakes assemblies of the main landing gears particularly the hydraulic lines and brake pads. The said inspection was based on the issue reported by the pilot regarding loss of brakes during landing roll. The work performed includes:

a. Manual brake pressure check using pedal brakes. There was consistent pressure noted on both pedal brakes.

b. Removed, disassembled, and inspected both L/H and R/H brake assemblies. It was found within serviceable limits, with no signs of brake fluid leaks.

c. Performed brake fluid contamination and discoloration check. There were no contaminants found and no visible discoloration was noted.

d. Inspected brake components. All inspected parts were found in good condition and within serviceable limits (Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5).

With the said inspection, both blades on L/H propeller assembly requires shop work/ inspection due to damage. Both blades on R/H propeller assembly is reparable (Figures 6, 7 and 8).

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Figure 2 - Left brake pads.

Figure 3 - RP-C 4321 left wheel brake disc.

Figure 4 - Right brake pads.

Figure 5 - RP-C 4321 right wheel brake disc.

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Figure 6 - RP-C 4321 Nicks at left propeller blade.

Figure 7 - RP-C 4321 other left propeller blade.

Figure 8 - RP-C4321 nicks at the right propeller blade.

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1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

The aircraft made an overrun and came to a full stop 20 meters from the end of the runway 36 with grid coordinates of 20°.43’38”N; 121°.48’35”E. Both propellers sustained nicks due to contact with loose stones after the aircraft overrun the runway and aircraft wheels partially embedded in mud.

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

The pilot was subjected to drug test after the occurrence and found with no significant medical findings. He also had undergone the post flight accident medical examination conducted by the Office of the Flight Surgeon and Aviation Medicine (OFSAM) on September 04, 2025. There was no medical impediment on the pilot that could have had a bearing on the incident.

1.14 Fire

There was no reported post-crash fire during on-site investigation.

1.15 Search and Survival Aspect

No search operation was deployed since the occurrence was within the vicinity of the airport. Alert rescue personnel from the airport authority arrived at the scene shortly after the serious incident occurred. The accident was survivable, as the aircraft cockpit was generally intact and no injuries to the occupants were reported. The responders found the pilot and five (5) passengers still fastened in their seatbelts inside the aircraft. They were assisted in disembarking the aircraft normally. The aircraft was repositioned to the concrete portion of the runway before the accident investigator arrived and was taxied back to the ramp.

1.16 Organizational and Management Information

1.16.1 Operator

Fliteline Airways Philippines Inc, is located at 1513 Metrica St. Sampaloc, Manila, Philippines. It offers air taxi, fish cargo, and chartered flights arranged and paid for by an individual or group for a specific trip. The company has its principal operations base at Plaridel Community Airport, Lumang Bayan, Plaridel, Bulacan.

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1.16.2 Maintenance

The maintenance function of RP-C4321 was undertaken by Fliteline Aviation Repair Station with a current Approved Maintenance Organization (AMO) Certificate number 66-07 located at Plaridel Community Airport, Lumang Bayan, Plaridel, Bulacan.

2. ANALYSIS

2.1 Human Factor

2.1.1 Personnel Training and Competence (Pilot)

The Pilot holds a valid Commercial Pilot License (CPL), Flight Instructor rating, and Ground Instructor rating issued by the Licensing and Certification Department (LCD)–Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP). He also possesses an appropriate rating for the type of aircraft operated at the time of the incident. Available records revealed that the pilot has several aircraft type ratings on Single and Multi-Engine-Land-Instrument, such as C152, C172, C182, BE55, PA-23-250, and PA-23-200.

Further interview with the pilot revealed that on May 15, 2025, he was issued a commercial pilot license by LCD-CAAP after applying for reinstatement and undergoing a skill test on the PA-23-250 type of aircraft. An additional rating was also issued as a flight instructor and ground instructor on the PA-23-250 type of aircraft on June 07, 2025, and June 20, 2025, respectively. He added that he had prior experience flying from Batanes and Itbayat before joining his current employer. Moreover, it also revealed that on August 25, 2025, the pilot had undergone the route check conducted by the company chief pilot from Basco to Itbayat and back. On the day of the serious incident, it was his fifth (5th) leg of ferrying passengers from Basco to Itbayat.

Available records showed the pilot had flown a total of 28+35 hours in the 90 days preceding the accident, 14+35 hours in the preceding 30 days, and 2+00 hours a week before the incident. It further revealed that during the week of the incident, 8+50 hours were flown. A review of the pilot's work schedule, flight times, flight duty times, and rest periods makes it possible to rule out fatigue as a factor in the accident.

2.2 Operations

2.2.1 Pre-Flight and Post Flight Inspection

A review of the pre-flight inspection checklist for RP-C4321 revealed that the required inspection of the aircraft was regularly performed by the pilot and crew before its first flight of the day. Records showed that for the aircraft until the time of the accident,

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all journey logbook entries were filled out. The last flight entry of the day was verified for completeness and accuracy. This data is in compliance with the company memo requiring adherence to strict compliance regarding the fill-up procedure of the journey logbook.

Further checking revealed that the maintenance personnel who conducted the pre-flight inspections of the subject aircraft had an Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT) license issued by the CAAP. Records also revealed that he was appropriately trained, authorized, and competent under the Approved Maintenance Organization (AMO) system. He had undergone relevant training in accordance with the AMO's Training and Authorization Program, and their authorizations were valid at the time of the task execution.

2.2.2 Maintenance Records

A review of the aircraft documents revealed that the aircraft had undergone the required 50-hour scheduled maintenance inspection on May 06, 2025. Additionally, a review of the aircraft maintenance logbooks disclosed that all required maintenance documentation on the subject aircraft is in order. There were also no recorded discrepancies in the Aircraft Maintenance and Flight Log or any pending maintenance actions for RP-C4321 until the day of the accident.

2.2.3 Flight Execution to Itbayat, Batanes from Basco, Batanes on August 28, 2025

On the morning of August 28, 2025, the pilot took off from Basco bound for Itbayat at around 0725H with five (5) passengers for his first flight of the day. All four (4) flights from Basco to Itbayat while ferrying passengers were uneventful. During his departure for his fifth (5th) flight to Itbayat, the weather was fair. However, two (2) passengers interviewed revealed that a few minutes after the aircraft took off from Basco, they noticed that there were rain showers in the general area of Itbayat, although they are not sure if there was rain in Itbayat airport. Personnel of Itbayat Airport confirmed that RP-C4321 landed a few minutes after the rain stopped over the airport.

Meanwhile, the pilot also revealed that prior to arrival at Itbayat Airport, there was a passing rain shower over the field. He claimed that the aircraft touched down in the early part of runway 36 and normally stopped in front of the terminal after applying a few taps on the brakes. However, in this incident flight, while on the landing roll, there was a loss of brakes as he applied brakes to stop the aircraft. The aircraft continued its landing roll and went out of the concrete portion of the runway. It travelled for another 20 meters before it stopped when the wheels got embedded in the mud. The passengers also said that the aircraft was fast after landing and did not

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show any sign of deceleration until it went off the runway.

2.2.4 Situational Awareness and Decision Making

On the day of the incident, the pilot and crew performed the pre-flight check and other necessary preparations prior to departure. However, there was a lapse in the situation awareness in the pilot handling of the aircraft during approach and landing roll in Itbayat during the incident flight. As mentioned by the pilot, during his approach until touchdown at runway 36, the flaps were set to half flaps. When asked why he did not apply the full flaps as he neared the runway, he said that it imposes handling difficulties in aircraft with low wing loading. Since Itbayat Airport, just like Basco Airport, was known for having a prevailing crosswind condition, he said that landing in full flaps causes the windward side of the aircraft to generate more lift and drag. In effect, the aircraft tends to roll, yaw, and pitch off its intended flight path.

On the other hand, flaps may be fully extended to give the aircraft a lower stalling speed during the approach to landing. This also allowed the aircraft to land in a shorter distance. The higher lift and drag associated with fully extended flaps produce greater drag, permitting a steeper approach. The greater lift permits a lower landing speed for the landing site. Furthermore, once the aircraft is on the ground, continued lift reduces tire friction and brake effectiveness, especially when wet, thus increasing stopping distance. To ensure safe deceleration, pilots must promptly retract the flaps to shift the aircraft's weight fully onto the wheels, maximizing brake performance. Notwithstanding the possible effect of a full flap landing, achieving the target airspeed over the threshold and flying the slowest approach speed for the wind conditions, selecting the maximum flap setting will provide the shortest operational landing distance.

2.2.5 Landing and Braking Technique

On the issue of why the pilot failed to bring the aircraft to a stop within the available landing distance of the runway. The pilot's flying techniques in the environmental conditions mentioned above are considered critical factors in completing a successful approach and landing maneuver at Itbayat Airport.

Although the flare reduces the approach rate of descent to a more acceptable rate for touchdown, the possibility that the flare was extended by the pilot for airspeed to be reduced resulted in additional runway distance needed during landing roll. A firm landing does not mean a hard landing but rather a deliberate or positive touchdown at the desired touchdown point. A landing executed solely for passenger comfort considerations, by extending the touchdown point beyond the touchdown zone, is not desirable or consistent with safety or regulations.

A proper approach and flare were also considered for the aircraft to touch down at the target touchdown point. It is essential to fly the aircraft onto the runway at the

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target touchdown point. Once the main wheels have contacted the runway, the pilot must maintain directional control and initiate the stopping process. The runway distance available to stop the aircraft is enough if the touchdown was on the right landing spot. During landing roll, wheel brakes are much more effective in slowing the aircraft than the aerodynamic drag produced during the flare maneuver. The minimum landing distance can be achieved by maintaining a continuous peak deceleration of the aircraft through extensive use of the brakes for maximum effectiveness. The nosewheel should be lowered onto the runway immediately after touchdown. Maintaining the nosewheel on the runway will assist in directional control. It also decreases the wing angle of attack, thereby decreasing lift and placing more load onto the tires, which increases tire-to-ground friction. When the runway is wet, the wheel brakes become the dominant deceleration force. When the runway length is limited, maximum wheel braking should be applied immediately after touchdown. In all situations, braking should be maintained until the aircraft slows to a safe taxi.

The combination of the wet runway condition and the pilot's flying techniques—such as using half flaps during landing, extending the flare to reduce airspeed, and failing to apply necessary braking during the landing roll—rendered the remaining runway length insufficient for the aircraft to stop completely on the paved surface.

In case of unstable approach for landing at Itbayat airport, included under the Company Operations Manual Part A, Chapter 7-Route and Aerodrome Qualification, Unstable Approach Procedure -Itbayat (RPLT), if an approach is declared unstable at or below 500 ft AGL, the Pilot-in-Command shall execute a go-around immediately as follows:

1. Power: Smoothly apply maximum go-around power.

2. Pitch: Establish initial climb attitude (approx. +7 to 10 degrees nose-up, adjust as required.

3. Configuration:
   - **a.** Verify positive rate of climb.
   - **b.** Retract landing gear.
   - **c.** Retract flaps incrementally as airspeed and climb performance allow.

4. Flight Path:
   - **a.** Maintain runway heading after liftoff to avoid terrain on both sides.
   - **b.** Be alert for cliffs and rising terrain off the approach ends of runway 18/36.
   - **c.** Do not initiate early turns until reaching safe altitude.

5. Climb Out:
   - **a.** Climb to traffic pattern altitude (1,000ft AGL) or as terrain clearance requires.
   - **b.** Rejoin circuit for another approach.

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2.3 Organizational Factor

2.3.1 Safety Culture and Management Support

Based on the interview conducted with the Maintenance Planner, the aircraft's maintenance requirements were systematically monitored and managed using an Excel-based tracking system. This system serves as a central tool where all aircraft maintenance records, including scheduled inspections, life-limited parts, and component replacements, are manually recorded and updated by the Maintenance Department. The goal is to ensure that no item was overlooked and that scheduled maintenance tasks are performed in a timely manner. The use of an Excel-based tracking system as a monitoring tool reflects strong maintenance planning and execution. These practices contribute positively to continued airworthiness and regulatory compliance and ensure the completion of maintenance requirements.

This commitment to safety and responsibility was further corroborated during the review of the unit's documentation. Records revealed that issues found on the aircraft maintenance logbook were properly reported, with corresponding actions promptly taken by the responsible personnel. Interviews also revealed strong management support, as the company consistently received the necessary resources to meet its requirements.

Based on a personnel interview and a review of 201 files belonging to the maintenance personnel of the aircraft, it shows that their authorizations were valid at the time of task execution. Said personnel had undergone relevant training in accordance with the Company AMO's Training and Authorization Program, and their authorizations were valid at the time of the task execution. Moreover, it was found during the interview with the maintenance personnel that their workload has been relatively light, as they primarily cater only to the needs of their company's operations in Basco. Their tasks are generally limited to supporting non-scheduled flights and conducting scheduled inspections or minor repairs on the aircraft, which indicated a manageable workload for the maintenance personnel.

3. CONCLUSIONS

3.1 Findings

a. The Pilot was qualified on the Piper Aircraft Inc., PA-23-250 type of aircraft.

b. The aircraft has valid Certificates of Airworthiness and Registration.

c. The aircraft was properly released for flight without any discrepancies noted on its logbook.

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d. The Pilot has a valid license and medical certificates issued by Office of Flight Surgeon and Aviation Medicine (OFSAM), CAAP.

e. Visual meteorological condition prevailed at the time of the incident.

f. The pilot revealed that prior arrival in Itbayat airport, there was passing rain shower over the field.

g. The aircraft continued its landing roll and went out of the concrete portion of the runway.

h. During the approach until touchdown at runway 36, the flaps were set to half flaps.

i. The aircraft travelled for another 20 meters before it stopped when the wheels got embedded in the mud.

3.2 Probable Cause

3.2.1 Primary Cause Factor

The pilot was unable to bring the aircraft to a complete stop within the available landing distance, resulting in a runway excursion beyond the paved surface.

3.2.2 Contributory Factors

a. The pilot exhibited diminished situational awareness during the approach and landing roll, leading to delayed and suboptimal braking response.

b. The wet runway condition upon landing reduced the coefficient of friction between the tires and the runway surface, thereby degrading braking effectiveness.

c. The pilot's delayed initiation of braking following main landing gear touchdown further reduced the aircraft's deceleration capability under wet runway conditions.

4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATION

4.1 Following the completion of the safety investigation, the Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (AAIIB) proposes the following safety recommendation to **Fliteline Airways Philippines, Inc.** through the regulatory oversight of the **Flight Standards Inspectorate Service (FSIS):**

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4.1.1 Safety Recommendation no. 25C09-4321-SR1

That Fliteline Airways Philippines, Inc. enhance its operational safety standards by integrating into its regular safety meetings, flight crew briefings, and recurrent training programs focused discussions on Threat and Error Management (TEM), Situational Awareness, and Unstable Approach Procedures, with specific emphasis on approach and landing operations at Itbayat Airport (RPLT).

-END-

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