



Republic of the Philippines  
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

# AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND INQUIRY BOARD

## FINAL REPORT

RP-C7284  
AVION TRANSPORT REGIONAL  
ATR 72-212A

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***OPERATOR: CEBGO, INC.***

***TYPE OF OPERATION: COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT***

***DATE OF OCCURRENCE: JUNE 06, 2024***

***PLACE OF OCCURRENCE: RUNWAY 12, BUTUAN AIRPORT, BANCASI, BUTUAN,  
AGUSAN DEL NORTE, PHILIPPINES***

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(ATR 72-212A RP-C7284 Final Report)

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## FOREWORD

This report was produced by the Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (AAIIB), Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines, MIA Road, Pasay City, Philippines.

The report is based upon the investigation carried out by the AAIIB in accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Republic Act 9497 Section 42, and Philippine Civil Aviation Regulation Part 13.

Readers are advised that the AAIIB investigates for the sole purpose of enhancing aviation safety. Consequently, AAIIB reports are confined to matters of safety significance and may be misleading if used for any other purpose. It should be noted that the information in AAIIB reports and recommendations is provided to promote aviation safety, and in no case is it intended to imply blame or liability.

Furthermore, no part of the AAIIB report or reports relating to any accident or investigation shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports.



## FINAL REPORT

**TITLE:** A serious incident involving an ATR 72-212A type of aircraft with Registry Number RP-C7284, operated by Cebgo, Inc. had a runway side excursion event at runway 12 of Butuan Airport, Bancasi, Butuan, Agusan del Norte, Philippines, on June 06, 2024.

### **Notification of Occurrence to National Authority**

The serious incident was reported by the Cebgo, Inc. Safety Manager to the CAAP AAIB on June 07, 2024.

### **Identification of the Investigation Authority**

The Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (AAIB), the mandated accident investigation organization within the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) as the state of Occurrence/Registry/Operator conducted the investigation.

### **Organization of the Investigation**

In accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Civil Aviation Regulation (PCAR) Part 13, an Investigator-In-Charge was appointed.

### **Authority Releasing the Report**

The Final Investigation Report was released by the Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (AAIB) and published on the CAAP website on **03 October 2025**.

### **Synopsis:**

On or about 1930H local time (1130 UTC) of June 06, 2024, an ATR 72-212A (72-600) aircraft, registered as RP-C7284, experienced a runway side excursion incident after landing on runway 12 of Butuan Airport in Bancasi, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte, Philippines. The aircraft was operated by Cebgo, Inc., a local commercial airline headquartered at the 3<sup>rd</sup> floor of Cebu Pacific Bldg., 8006 Domestic Road, Pasay City 1301, Philippines. The aircraft came from Mactan-Cebu International Airport for a scheduled commercial flight to Butuan. On board the aircraft were two (2) flight deck crew and two (2) cabin crew, along with twenty-seven (27) passengers. The investigation determined that the probable cause of the serious incident was the flight crew's failure to manage the aircraft's directional control after bounced landing.

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

AAIIB	:	Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board
AANSOO	:	Aerodrome and Air Navigation Service Safety Oversight Office
AGL	:	Above Ground Level
AMO	:	Approved Maintenance Organization
AMSL	:	Above Mean Sea Level
ASDA	:	Accelerate-Stop Distance Available
ATPL	:	Airline Transport Pilot License
CAAP	:	Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
CoA	:	Certificate of Airworthiness
CoR	:	Certificate of Registration
CPL	:	Commercial Pilot License
CRM	:	Crew Resource Management
CVR	:	Cockpit Voice Recorder
DFDR	:	Digital Flight Data Recorder
DME	:	Distance Measuring Equipment
IAS	:	Indicated Airspeed
IFR	:	Instrument Flight Rules
LDA	:	Landing Distance Available
LOFT	:	Line-Oriented Flight Training
OFSAM	:	Office of the Flight Surgeon and Aviation Medicine
PAPI	:	Precision Approach Path Indicator
PCAR	:	Philippine Civil Aviation Regulation
PIC	:	Pilot-In-Command
RFFS	:	Rescue and Firefighting Services
RPM	:	Revolution Per Minute
NM	:	Nautical Miles
UTC	:	Coordinated Universal Time
VFR	:	Visual Flight Rules
VOR	:	Very High Frequency Omni-Directional Range
TODA	:	Take-Off Distance Available
TORA	:	Take-Off Run Available



## 1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

Aircraft Registration No.	:	RP-C7284
Aircraft Manufacturer/Model:		Avions Transport Regional/ATR 72-212A
Operator	:	Cebgo, Inc.
Address of Operator	:	3 <sup>rd</sup> Floor, Cebu Pacific Bldg., 8006 Domestic Road, Pasay City 1301, Philippines
Place of Occurrence	:	Runway 12, Butuan Airport, Bancasi, Butuan, Agusan del Norte, Philippines
Date/Time of Occurrence	:	June 06, 2024, at about 1930H/1130 UTC
Type of Operation	:	Commercial Air Transport
Phase of Flight	:	Landing
Type of Occurrence	:	Runway side excursion

### 1.1 History of the Flight

On or about 1930H local time (1130 UTC) of June 06, 2024, an ATR 72-212A (72-600) type of aircraft with registration number RP-C7284 experienced a runway side excursion incident after landing on runway 12 of Butuan Airport, Bancasi, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte, Philippines.

The aircraft is owned and operated by Cebgo, Inc. The aircraft came from Mactan-Cebu International Airport for a scheduled commercial flight to Butuan as flight DG-6929. On board the aircraft were two (2) flight deck crew and two (2) cabin crew, along with twenty-seven (27) passengers.

According to interviews with both pilots, they stated that they were unaware of having a runway excursion. The Pilot-In-Command (PIC) was at the controls during the landing, and they recalled that a heavy downpour occurred just after touchdown, severely limiting visibility outside the cockpit. Only the runway edge lights were barely visible through their peripheral vision during the landing roll. They also added that they landed on the

runway centerline within the touchdown zone and were able to taxi the aircraft slowly towards the ramp for parking and passenger deplaning. Upon parking, they reported suspecting a hard landing, not a runway excursion, and consulted with their maintenance base for possible remote dispatch of the aircraft for its next turnaround flight. The aircraft was able to depart later back to Cebu without any untoward incident.

After the departure of all flights that night, CAAP Butuan and personnel from the airline's ground handler conducted an ocular inspection of the runway and found tire marks on the grassy area beside the runway, suspected to be from the Cebgo's ATR aircraft as it was reported that there was presence of grass on the right main landing gear tires of the aircraft during parking.

The above occurrence was not reported by the involved flight deck crew, and the aircraft was flown for nine (9) more sectors the day after the incident before it was grounded upon its arrival at Laguindingan Airport in Cagayan De Oro.

## 1.2 Injuries to Person (s)

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others
Fatal	0	0	0
Serious	0	0	0
Minor	0	0	0
None	4	27	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	4	27	0

## 1.3 Damage to Aircraft

The aircraft did not sustain any damage.

## 1.4 Other Damages

There was no reported other damage because of this incident.

## 1.5 Personnel Information

### 1.5.1 Pilot-In-Command (PIC)

Gender : Male  
 Date of Birth : December 03, 1987  
 Nationality : Filipino  
 License : 103421 ATPL, valid until September 30, 2024



Type rating	: Airplane: Multi-Engine Land – ATR 72-600
Medical Certificate	: Class 1, valid until November 28, 2024
Date of last medical	: May 07, 2024
Total flying time	: 6,200 + 00 Hours as of June 10, 2024
Total flying time on type	: 2,075 + 02 Hours as of June 10, 2024

### 1.5.1 First Officer (F/O)

Gender	: Male
Date of Birth	: August 01, 1996
Nationality	: Filipino
License	: 137840 CPL, valid until March 31, 2028
Type rating	: Airplane: Single and Multi-Engine Land – Instrument – C152, C172, ATR 72-600
Medical Certificate	: Class 1, valid until April 13, 2025
Date of last medical	: April 03, 2024
Total flying time	: 293 + 50 Hours as of June 10, 2024
Total flying time on type	: 93 + 50 Hours as of June 10, 2024

## 1.6 Aircraft Information

The ATR 72-212A is a regional turboprop aircraft developed by the French-Italian aircraft manufacturer ATR (Avions de transport régional). It is a stretched variant of the ATR 42 and designed for short to medium-haul flights.

It is widely used by regional airlines around the world due to its efficiency, reliability, and cost-effectiveness. It is suitable for short to medium-haul routes, often serving routes that are not economically viable for larger jets.

### 1.6.1 Aircraft Data

Registration Mark	: RP-C7284
Manufacturer	: Avions de transport régional (ATR)
Country of Manufacturer	: France and Italy
Type/Model	: ATR 72-212A (72-600)
Operator	: Cebgo, Inc.
Serial No.	: 1429
Year of Manufacture	: 2017
Certificate of Airworthiness	: Valid until May 15, 2025
Certificate of Registration	: Valid until May 14, 2025
Category	: Transport
Gross Weight	: 23,000 kgs.
Number of Flight Crew	: 2/2
Number of Passengers	: 78



Airframe total time : 8,935 + 00 Hours as of last C of A

### 1.6.2 Engine Data

Manufacturer : Pratt and Whitney  
Type : Turboprop  
Model : PW127M  
Engine Serial No. : PCE-ED1408 (ENG 1)  
PCE-ED1302 (ENG 2)  
Engine TBO : On Condition  
Engine TSO : On Condition  
Engine Total Time : 8,655 + 00 Hours (ENG 1), 9,054 + 00  
Hours (ENG 2) as of last C of A

### 1.6.3 Propeller Data

Manufacturer : Hamilton Sundstrand  
Type : Constant Speed  
Model : 568F-1  
Propeller Serial No. : FR2017010010 (ENG 1)  
FR2017010011 (ENG 2)  
Propeller TBO : 10,500 Hours  
Propeller TSO : New  
Propeller Total Time : 8,935 + 00 Hours (ENG 1 and 2) as of last C of A

## 1.7 Meteorological Information

Based on records from the Butuan Airport Control Tower, the available METAR information was as follows:

Time (UTC)	Wind Condition	Sky Condition	Visibility	Temp.	Dewpoint	QNH	Remarks
1100	270° at 06 knots	SCT 015, CB, OVC 080	2 km	29°C	28°C	1011hPa	RASH, CB/TSTM W, RASH N/NE/E/SE/S/SW/W
1200	Calm	SCT 015, CB, OVC 080	2 km	26°C	24°C	1012hPa	RASH, CB N/NE/E/S/SW/N/NW



## 1.8 Aids to Navigation

The flight was carried out under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). While the airport is equipped with VOR/DME, PAPI, and runway edge lights, the only available instrument approaches based on the published Philippine AIP charts are RNP approaches to runway 12 and runway 30.

## 1.9 Communications

The aircraft is equipped with a standard radio transceiver. Communications were carried out between the pilot and Butuan Airport Tower.

## 1.10 Aerodrome Information

Butuan Airport (IATA: BXU, ICAO: RPME) is an airport serving the general area of Butuan and Agusan del Norte. It is the only airport in Agusan del Norte and the largest in Caraga region.

### 1.10.1 Aerodrome Geographical and Administrative Data

ARP coordinates and site at AD	085706.6669 N, 1252841.2366 E
Direction and distance from (city)	272° 25', 5.57KM from Butuan town.
Elevation/Reference temperature	13.617M (44.675FT) AMSL.
Geoid undulation at AD ELEV PSN	NIL
MAG VAR/Annual Change	0.6°W (2014) / 2.9' increasing.
AD Operator, address, telephone, telefax, telex, AFS	Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines Butuan Airport Bancasi, Butuan City 8600 Agusan del Norte Tel. No.: (085) 341-5142 (Telefax) AFS: RPMEYYX
Types of traffic permitted (IFR/VFR)	IFR-VFR.

### 1.10.2 Operational Hours

AD Operator	MON - FRI: 0000 - 0900
ATS Reporting Office (ARO)	2100 - 1300. For extension of SER, one (1) day PN is required
MET Briefing Office	H24
ATS	2100 - 1300
Remarks	Airport Operations: 2100 - 1300.



### 1.10.3 Rescue and Fire Fighting Services

AD category for fire fighting	CAT VI
Rescue equipment	Two (2) Fire trucks (Oshkosh Striker 4x4)

### 1.10.4 Aprons and Taxiways

Apron surface and strength	Surface: Concrete Strength: PCN 39.7
Taxiway width, surface and strength	Width: 23 m Surface: Concrete Strength: NIL

### 1.10.5 Runway Physical Characteristics

RWY	TRUE BRG	Dimensions of RWY	Strength (PCN) and surface of RWY and SWY	THR coordinates RWY end coordinates THR geoid undulation	THR elevation and highest elevation of TDZ of precision APP RWY
12	116.31° GEO 115.62° MAG	2,096 m X 45 m	PCN 47 R/B/W/U CONC	085721.7884N 1252810.4828E	8.354 m
30	296.31° GEO 295.62° MAG	2,096 m X 45 m	PCN 47 R/B/W/U CONC	085651.5453N 1252911.9901E	13.617 m

### 1.10.6 Declared Distances

RWY	TORA	TODA	ASDA	LDA
12	2,096 m	2,256 m	2,156 m	2,096 m
30	2,096 m	2,236 m	2,156 m	2,096 m

### 1.10.7 Approach and Runway Lighting

RWY	APCH LGT type, LEN, INTST	THR LGT colour, WBAR	VASIS, (MEHT), PAPI	TDZ, LGT LEN
12	SALS 300 M LIH	Green WBAR: 2	PAPI Left 3.0° (14.01 M)	NIL



30	SALS 360 M LIH	Green WBAR: 2	PAPI Left 3.0° (15.38 M)	NIL
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RWY	RWY Centre Line LGT Length, spacing, colour, INTST	RWY edge LGT LEN, spacing, colour, INTST	RWY End LGT colour, WBAR	Remarks
12	SALS 300 M LIH	Green WBAR: 2	PAPI Left 3.0° (14.01 M)	SALS Location of Cross Bar: 300 M FM RWY THR.  THR LGT NR of LGT fixture per WBAR: 6.  PAPI Path WID: 0.3°. VIS RG: 6 miles. DIST FM THR: 256 m  RWY End LGT NR of LGT Fixture per WBAR: 6.
30	SALS 360 M LIH	Green WBAR: 2	PAPI Left 3.0° (15.38 M)	THR LGT NR of LGT Fixture per WBAR: 6  PAPI Path WID: 0.32°. VIS RG: 5 miles. DIST FM THR: 284 m  RWY End LGT NR of LGT Fixture per WBAR: 6

### 1.11 Flight Recorders

The aircraft is equipped with a Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) and a Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) as required by the Philippine Civil Aviation Regulations (PCAR).

The recorded parameters and data were intact, allowing for an accurate reconstruction of the incident dynamics. The data were analyzed and validated with



the assistance of the Transport Safety Investigation Bureau (TSIB) of Singapore using the appropriate interpretation tools.

### 1.11.1 DFDR

Manufacturer : L3 Aviation Products  
Model : FA2100  
Part No. : 2100-4245-60  
Serial No. : 0001112872

The recording quality of the FDR data was of good quality. The FDR contained 234,092 seconds of synchronized subframe data that included recorded data of the incident flight. The FDR had 1,063 parameters in the data frame file. Document “DFDR recorded parameters decoding law” (Service Letter No. ATR72-31-6010 Rev. 12) provided by the operator was used to convert the FDR data to engineering units based on data frame version V4.

The recorded flight data includes another nine (9) sectors that were recorded after the incident flight before the flight recorder was removed from the aircraft. Timings of all the downloaded data are based on UTC, with each subframe increasing by 1 second.

On the flight data readout, the aircraft departed from Mactan-Cebu International Airport on runway 22 and landed on runway 12 of Butuan Airport.




Figure 1 - Flight global trajectory.




Figure 2 - End of the trajectory.

At 11:29:00 UTC, the aircraft is (landing gears down and flaps at 33°) on the approach glide slope with IAS at 105 knots, vertical speed at -580 ft/min, magnetic heading at 119°.

At 11:29:13 UTC, the autopilot was disengaged when the aircraft was at 556 feet above ground level (AGL). The aircraft's magnetic heading was 118.4°, track angle was 115.7°, indicated airspeed was 102 knots, and vertical speed was -576 feet/min. The recorded wind direction and speed at this point were 152.9° and 8 knots, respectively.

Over the next 50 seconds, prior to the aircraft touching down on the runway, it was observed that the aircraft oscillated around its longitudinal axis, where the roll angle varied between -8° (left wing down) and +7° (right wing down). There were corresponding cyclical inputs (See Figure 3) to the control wheel, ranging between 34.46° (left wing down) and -32.84° (right wing down). The magnetic heading in the same period was oscillating between 115.3° and 122.6°. The maximum descent rate recorded during this period did not exceed -800 feet/min.




Figure 3 – Cyclical inputs to the control wheel and oscillation of the roll angle after autopilot disengagement.

At 11:30:04 UTC, the first main gear weight-on-wheel (WOW) “ground” signal was recorded momentarily before it transitioned to “air” again. This is consistent with the aircraft experiencing a bounce on the initial touchdown and becoming airborne again. The aircraft heading during the initial touchdown was 117.5° (nose pointing right of the runway), and the recorded coordinates were +8.954581 (latitude) +125.471992 (longitude). The maximum vertical acceleration recorded during this initial bounce was +1.89 G. A second later, the second sequence of air-ground-air WOW signal transition was recorded for the main gear WOW, with a similar air-ground-air WOW signal transition recorded for the nose gear. The second touchdown was flat, where all three gears touched down simultaneously with a low pitch angle. The final “air” to “ground” WOW transition for the main gear was recorded at 11:30:06 UTC, and the same WOW transition for the nose gear was recorded within the second (see Figure 4).




Figure 4 – WOW transition of the main gears and the nose gear.

It was observed that almost immediately after the first bounce, the brake pressure for the left outboard and inboard wheels started to increase to approximately 1,200 PSI between 11:30:04 UTC to 11:30:10 UTC while the brake pressure for the right outboard and inboard wheels did not show any appreciable increase until after 11:30:10 UTC (see Figure 5). During this period, the rudder pedal input varied from +4.8 (left yaw command) to -5.5° (right yaw command). The aircraft heading after the final bounce was 116.3° and continued to increase to 118.3° before decreasing to a minimum value of 106.1° (see Figure 6).




Figure 5 – An Increase in the left brake pressure coincided with left rudder pedal inputs.




Figure 6

Below is a summary of the extracted key FDR parameters (Figures 7 and 8) during the flight's final approach and touchdown:

Time (UTC)	QNH Altitude (ft) Radio Height (ft)	Distance from the runway threshold (NM)	IAS (kt) Vertical Speed (ft/min)	Information on FDR parameters
11:29:13	535 556	1.3	102 -576	Autopilot disconnected (Yaw damper mode)
11:29:56	42 96	0.1	96 -480	Pitch down action on the wheel (Pitch angle from 0° to -2.5°)
11:29:57	34 58	0.03	96 -500	Control wheel position of -33° (right turn)
11:30:00	- 24	-0.04	103 -560	Start decreasing of the engine torque (PLA on flight idle)
11:30:03	- 2	-0.12	98 -512	Pitch angle from -2.5° to 1°
Touchdown and roll out				
Remark: The control wheel travels from -65° to +65°.				

Figure 7





Time (UTC)	Ground Speed (kt) Brake Pressure (psi) for 2 LH wheels/2 RH wheels	Control Wheel Position (deg)	Landing Gear (○: on ground)	Information on FDR Parameters
11:30:04	98 51-51/44-45	Right turn (-6°)		Vertical acceleration = 1.89 G (1 <sup>st</sup> bounce)
11:30:05	95 50-56/43-43	Left turn (6°)		Vertical acceleration = 1.5 G (2 <sup>nd</sup> bounce)
11:30:06	91 408-454/56-59	Left turn (1°)		Touchdown
11:30:07	91 408-454/56-59	Left turn (20°)		-
11:30:09	69 1,082-835/31-77	Left turn (43°)	-	Increase in left braking
11:30:10	63 1,221-1,185/44-49	Left turn (38°)	-	Increase in left braking
11:30:12	52 692-656/1,250-890	Right turn (-17°)	-	Increase in right braking
11:30:13	52 216-536/1,250-96	Right turn (-33°)	-	-
11:30:14	48 614-770/107-112	Right turn (-12°)	-	-
11:30:18	24 1,776-1,797/70-908	Control wheel position at the neutral position	-	-
Remark: The mean value of the recorded wind velocity is 6 knots between 800 ft and 100 ft with an associated direction of 150°.				

Figure 8

Following the brief runway side excursion, the aircraft was able to vacate the runway under its own power and taxi to its assigned parking stand.

### 1.11.2 CVR

There was no readout made on the CVR as the incident was not reported by the flight crew. By the time the AAIB retrieved the recorder, the aircraft had already operated nine (9) additional sectors, resulting in the overwriting of data related to the subject flight.

### 1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

A post-incident runway inspection revealed tire marks indicating that the aircraft touched down at coordinates 8° 57' 18" N, 125° 28' 16" E, which is approximately 200.6 meters from the threshold of runway 12. The touchdown point was noted to be predominantly on the right side of the runway centerline, with the left main landing gear approximately 13 meters from the centerline and the right main landing gear approximately 17 meters from the centerline.

Further inspection revealed that the aircraft's right main landing gear exited the paved portion of the runway approximately 240 meters from its touchdown point and remained in the grassy area for about 158 meters before returning to the concrete surface of the runway. Additionally, the right main landing gear was approximately 24 meters from the runway centerline and around 1.8 meters from the runway edge line while off the paved surface. These physical observations serve as strong indications that a runway excursion had occurred (Figure 9).



Figure 9 – Photo taken the morning after the incident, showing tire path marks outside of the runway's paved surface.

### **1.13 Medical and Pathological Information**

After the occurrence was escalated by the operator's Safety Manager, the involved pilots underwent mandatory drug and alcohol testing at a local clinic in Manila. The results were later submitted to CAAP OFSAM for the required post-accident/incident medical examination. The pilots were subsequently issued a medical clearance by the aforementioned CAAP office.

### **1.14 Fire**

No reports were received regarding any post-incident fires.

### **1.15 Survival Aspects**

The incident was survivable, as the aircraft did not sustain any damage during the brief runway excursion. Following this, the crew successfully taxied the aircraft to the ramp without any reported damage or handling issues, allowing passengers to deplane and preparations for the turnaround flight to proceed.

### **1.16 Test and Research**

No additional tests were conducted on the aircraft, as there were no reported technical issues prior to or following the incident.

### **1.17 Organizational and Management Information**

Cebgo, Inc., operating as Cebgo, is the regional brand of Cebu Pacific. It is the successor company to SEAIR, Inc., which previously operated as South East Asian Airlines and Tigerair Philippines. It is now owned by JG Summit, the parent company of Cebu Pacific which operates the airline. The airline's main base has been transferred from Clark International Airport in Angeles City to Ninoy Aquino International Airport in Metro Manila. Currently, it operates an all-ATR fleet, with a total of 16 in service.

## 2. ANALYSIS

### 2.1 Human Factor

#### 2.1.1 Personnel Training and Competence

The pilots involved both hold valid pilot licenses issued by the CAAP, with appropriate ratings for the type of aircraft operated at the time of the incident. The Pilot-In-Command (PIC) has been with the company since 2016, briefly left to join an international airline based in Hong Kong, and rejoined the company in 2019. Meanwhile, the First Officer (F/O) joined the company in February 2024 after successfully completing his flight training at Airworks Aviation Academy and obtaining his type rating from CAE Philippines.

In addition to the above information, records from the operator highlight the following significant training completed by the involved flight crew:

	Training	Date Completed
Captain	GTR-Flight Crew Briefing/Updates	January 30, 2023
	ATR UPRT Ground School	January 31, 2023
	SIM Proficiency Check	February 14, 2023
	SIM LOFT – Recurrent Training	February 15, 2023
	Annual Line Check	March 12, 2023
	CRM	April 08, 2023
	SIM Proficiency Check	August 10, 2023
	SIM LOFT – Recurrent Training	August 11, 2023
	SIM Proficiency Check	February 24, 2024
	SIM LOFT – Recurrent Training	February 25, 2024
	Annual Line Check	March 13, 2024
	Full Flight Simulator Training	April 26 and 27, 2024
	Right-Hand Seat Qualification	April 29, 2024
	Zero Flight Time Training	April 30, 2024
	RHS/LHS Qualification Training	May 15, 2024
TRI Training	May 26 and 29, 2024	
-First Officer	Phase Briefing	February 05, 2024
	GTR/Basic Indoctrination	February 06, 2024
	Initial Ground Training	February 19, 2024



	1 <sup>st</sup> Observer Flight	March 05, 2025
	Full flight Simulator Training	March 12, 2025
	Skill Test	March 20, 2025
	1 <sup>st</sup> SLF as TFO	April 16, 2025
	SLF Evaluation Flight	May 09, 2025
	1 <sup>st</sup> SLF Route Qualification	May 14, 2025

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the involved flight crews were qualified and competent to perform their assigned duties on June 6, 2024.

### 2.1.2 Fatigue and Health Factors

A review of the two pilots' schedules from April 1 to June 5, 2024, found no significant patterns suggesting an overwhelming workload that might have resulted in fatigue or any factors that could have contributed to diminished performance or alertness. Additionally, both the actual and published schedules showed no reports of any exceedance related to their duty time limitations during the week of the incident.

Based on the above information, including the records and results of the medical tests conducted on the pilots, as well as the evaluation by the CAAP OFSAM, it can be concluded that fatigue or the pilot's physical condition, in general, is not a factor in this incident.

### 2.1.3 Situational Awareness and Decision Making

On the night of the incident, the flight encountered adverse weather conditions at the destination airport, making the landing particularly challenging. During the pre-flight briefing, it was agreed that the trainee First Officer would serve as the Pilot Flying (PF), while the Captain would assume the role of Pilot Monitoring (PM). However, as the weather continued to deteriorate during the initial approach, coupled with the added complexity of nighttime operations, the Captain decided to take control of the aircraft. This demonstrated sound situational awareness while prioritizing safety and minimizing risk.

Recognizing that conditions were not yet suitable for a safe landing, the pilots opted to enter a holding pattern, allowing time for the weather to improve before making another approach. This decision reflects their safety-first mindset, ensuring they would only proceed with landing once conditions became more favorable for a safe approach and touchdown.

As the flight proceeded with landing, both pilots claimed they touched down on the runway centerline and encountered a sudden heavy downpour upon touchdown, which significantly reduced visibility. This occurrence of a heavy rain

during landing was likewise confirmed by the ATC and ground personnel as well as from the obtained copy of the CCTV recording. The flight crew further stated that they simply continued their landing roll after touchdown at a reduced speed and proceeded to the taxiway before parking at the apron. When asked if they experienced a side excursion after touchdown, they denied any such occurrence, asserting that everything remained normal until they reached the parking area.

However, data from the DFDR reveals that the pilot made aggressive corrective inputs to maintain directional control immediately after touchdown. This suggests that the crew was aware of a possible deviation from the intended path. The recorded control inputs indicate an active effort to steer the aircraft back on course, implying that they likely recognized the deviation and took corrective action to prevent further divergence from the intended ground track. Furthermore, physical evidence, including tire marks extending beyond the paved runway surface, corroborates the occurrence of a possible runway excursion. These findings suggest that the crew maintained a level of situational awareness during the landing roll, contradicting their assertion that nothing unusual occurred and that visibility was completely lost upon touchdown, as both the data and physical evidence point to active control efforts in response to a recognized deviation.

## **2.2 Operations**

### **2.2.1 Flight Execution – Approach and Landing**

The June 6, 2024, flight was a scheduled commercial flight from Cebu to Butuan. This flight was likewise part of the trainee First Officer's Phase 2 Supervised Line Flying/Route Qualification (SLF/RQ) training, which the company requires before becoming a fully qualified First Officer.

On that evening, the flight departed from Cebu at 1828H, following all standard pre-flight preparations, including weather briefings and operational checks. The departure from Cebu was uneventful, and the flight proceeded normally toward Butuan.

Upon initial contact with Butuan Tower, the crew received marginal weather information, reporting runway 12 in use, wind from 170° at 8 knots, visibility of 4 kilometers, temperature of 29°C, and QNH 1010. Additionally, a thunderstorm was observed northwest to east of the station, with heavy rain over the airfield.

Faced with these conditions, the flight crew coordinated closely to ensure a safe and well-managed operation. During their interview, both pilots stated that clear communication and effective task sharing were maintained to manage the challenges posed by the deteriorating weather conditions. Good Crew Resource Management (CRM) was observed throughout the flight, particularly during the

critical moments when they decided to enter a holding pattern while waiting for the weather to improve, and later, as they commenced their final approach.

Once weather conditions became more favorable, the aircraft was cleared for an RNP approach to runway 12. Data from the DFDR and crew statements indicate that the approach was stabilized and within operational limits. The aircraft maintained a descent speed ranging from 100 to 108 knots, slightly above the target approach speed ( $V_{app}$ ) of 96 knots, which still fell within the Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) criteria of  $V_{app} \pm 5$  kt (FCTM Chapter 25 – Stabilization Criteria, dated September 2022). The mean vertical speed during descent was approximately -600 ft/min, and except for a brief pitch-down action that caused the aircraft to momentarily dip below the glide slope at 96 feet, the approach met all stabilization criteria.

Subsequent analysis of the DFDR data provided detailed insight into the aircraft's behavior during the final 50 seconds of flight prior to touchdown. During this phase, the aircraft exhibited noticeable oscillations around its longitudinal axis, with roll angles fluctuating between left and right. These oscillations, accompanied by corresponding cyclical control wheel inputs, suggest lateral instability likely influenced by continuous control corrections.

The recorded wind conditions (maximum of 9 knots, mean of 6 knots, varying between  $151^\circ$  and  $191^\circ$ , with a crosswind component of approximately 5 knots) indicated a slight right crosswind with no evidence of gusts. These relatively calm conditions were assessed to be non-contributory to the instability. Instead, the aircraft's response appeared more consistent with pilot control activity, particularly following autopilot disengagement, when increased control inputs from the PIC were recorded. This further supports the assessment that the observed instability was more likely the result of pilot-induced control inputs rather than external factors.

The cyclical nature of the control wheel inputs and the aircraft's corresponding roll behavior are consistent with pilot-induced oscillations (PIO), a condition where overcorrection or delayed responses can increase the magnitude of aircraft movement instead of stabilizing it. The combination of aerodynamic factors, crosswind correction, and pilot input likely contributed to the behavior observed. Such inputs can result in pitch or roll instability, which may lead to a firmer than normal landing or bounce. Despite the oscillations, the crew maintained a stabilized approach and proceeded with the landing.

DFDR data recorded during the final moments of approach, just prior to touchdown, further support the above assessment. At 11:29:57, a right control wheel input was recorded, causing the aircraft to shift slightly to the right of the runway centerline at approximately 58 feet AGL, just 0.03 NM from the runway threshold. Despite this lateral deviation, the touchdown occurred without

significant deviation from the intended landing path. However, the DFDR recorded a peak vertical acceleration of 1.89 G, indicating a firm landing. Two bounce events were also recorded during touchdown. In the interviews with both flight deck crews, there was no mention of any bounce, and the aircraft was reported to have continued with its normal rollout.

Following the touchdown, further analysis revealed that brake pressure for the left outboard and inboard wheels increased to approximately 1,200 PSI, while the right-side wheels showed no significant brake pressure. Additionally, rudder pedal input varied from  $+4.8^\circ$  (left yaw command) to  $-5.5^\circ$  (right yaw command), indicating active directional control inputs during the initial phase of the rollout. These inputs suggest that the flight crew was not only actively managing directional control but also fully aware of their position on the runway. As such, the flight crew's claim of having lost visibility immediately after touchdown appears inconsistent with the recorded data.



Figure 10 – Trajectory of the landing.




Figure 11 – Glide path.






Figure 12 - Graph indicating the time that left actions on the wheel and the left braking actions occurred.




Figure 13 – Zoomed graph of relevant parameters.

## 2.2.2 Aircraft Parking and Turn-Around Flight

During the interview, both pilots stated that after completing the landing roll, the aircraft taxied to the ramp for ground servicing and passenger deplaning. Upon parking and establishing communication with ground personnel, the PIC advised that passenger boarding for the turnaround flight would be temporarily put on hold, as they needed to seek remote dispatch clearance from maintenance. According to the flight crew, the remote dispatch was due to the noted high vertical acceleration upon touchdown.

Afterward, the PIC also inquired about how their landing appeared and whether any grass-cutting activity had taken place that day, as they had observed a significant amount of grass and plastic debris in a flooded area of the runway during taxi. In response, ground personnel contacted BXU ATC, who confirmed that grass-cutting activities had indeed been conducted earlier that day, however, the activity occurred near runway 30, which is at the opposite end of the runway from where the aircraft had landed (runway 12). Regarding the landing, ground personnel replied that they had not observed anything unusual due to the heavy rain and darkness at the time the flight landed.

As the conversation shifted to other routine operational matters, ground personnel continued the ground servicing of the aircraft, and it was during this time that they observed the presence of grass on the aircraft's landing gears. They asked the PIC whether the debris needed to be removed, to which the PIC replied that they could proceed with cleaning it if it would not be too much of a hassle. At that point, ground personnel did not consider the debris unusual and assumed it was related to the PIC's earlier inquiry about grass-cutting activities at the airport that day. The ground personnel then proceeded with the washing of the landing gears by bringing buckets of water to the ramp to clean the aircraft.

This observation by the ground personnel coincided with a separate but telling action by the PIC. While the ground crew proceeded with washing the landing gear and the flight crew awaited remote dispatch approval from maintenance, airport CCTV footage captured the PIC disembarking from the aircraft and proceeding immediately to the RH side. Although the footage did not capture his exact activities on that side, it is presumed that he exited the aircraft to conduct the required walkaround inspection prior to their next departure. Interestingly, instead of following the standard walkaround sequence, which starts from the LH side, proceeding to the nose, then the RH side, and finally the aft section before boarding the aircraft again, he went directly to the RH side. This may indicate that the PIC was aware of a potential issue following the landing. His decision to proceed directly to the right-hand side and deviate from the standard walkaround



sequence suggests an effort to examine the RH landing gear area for any possible abnormalities or concerns.

Subsequently, the remote dispatch approval was received, and the PIC gave clearance for passenger boarding for their scheduled turnaround flight back to Cebu. After the completion of the boarding process, and just minutes before door closure, the ramp supervisor attending the flight was approached by a local CAAP personnel who advised her to contact BXU ATC. She complied and attempted to reach ATC to inquire about the matter, however, she was unable to clearly hear or understand the message from the on-duty controller due to her cellphone being wet from rain exposure, as well as the ambient noise from another aircraft that was about to park. As a result, she informed ATC that she would call again after dispatching the station's remaining flights.

At around 2145H, all scheduled Cebu Pacific and Cebgo flights out of BXU had been fully dispatched by ground personnel. It was only at this point that the ramp supervisor was able to call again BXU ATC. During their conversation, she was informed that a runway inspection had been conducted by the airport's Rescue and Firefighting Services (RFFS) in response to the earlier report concerning the presence of grass along the runway. In the course of this inspection, RFFS personnel observed tire marks in the grassy area adjacent to the runway's paved surface.

With this information, it was subsequently agreed to carry out a second ocular inspection to validate the initial findings, which they plan to take place once all remaining flights have departed from BXU. During this follow-up inspection, ground personnel confirmed the presence of the same tire marks previously reported by RFFS. By that time, however, the aircraft suspected to have been involved in a possible runway excursion had already landed in Cebu.

The ramp supervisor reported this observation to her immediate superior and later relayed it through the airline's operations group chat. The incident was also included in the daily station report submitted by ground personnel at the conclusion of the day's operations. Notably, despite this information being shared internally, the occurrence was never escalated or formally treated as a potential safety issue. Furthermore, it was found that the matter had not been reported through the airline's official safety reporting channel, and the photos taken by ground personnel showing the tire marks were also not forwarded to the relevant parties.

As for BXU's ATC protocols, it is worth noting that the event was escalated through its standard reporting channel. However, during the time the aircraft was still on the ground and when the RFFS observed tire marks outside the paved surface of the runway, no direct coordination or inquiry was made with the flight crew of the involved aircraft, and it was only with the ground personnel. According to the



interview with the ATC on duty, no direct inquiry was made with the crew due to the absence of the pilot report and concrete evidence linking the flight to the suspected runway excursion. They are also not aware of the presence of grass found in the aircraft tires.

While the aforementioned observations made by both the PIC and ground personnel, such as the unusual presence of grass on the aircraft tires, and the tire marks beyond the runway's paved surface, as reported by RFFS to ATC, suggested a potential safety concern, the matter was neither escalated by ground personnel through the proper safety reporting channels nor further validated by ATC with the involved flight crew. This highlights the need for improved exercise of sound judgment, stricter adherence to established reporting protocols, and heightened vigilance in evaluating irregular observations that may point to underlying operational risks on the part of both airline ground personnel and airport ATC.

## **2.3 Organizational Factor**

### **2.3.1 Safety Culture and Management Support**

Cebgo, Inc., as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cebu Pacific, has developed and implemented its own Safety Management System (SMS), which is patterned after and aligned with the SMS framework of its parent company. This ensures consistency in safety standards, risk management processes, and overall safety culture across both carriers, while allowing Cebgo to address its specific operational needs while following the overall safety approach of the Cebu Pacific group.

Each member of the organization is introduced to the company's core safety values upon onboarding and is consistently encouraged to uphold a strong commitment to safety. This culture of safety is reinforced through regular training, ongoing communication, and active engagement in safety-related initiatives. The organization's dedication to safety and personal responsibility is further demonstrated by documented evidence, such as compliance with safety protocols, proactive hazard reporting, and the consistent application of safety procedures in daily operations.

Management support is also evident through the implementation of its Safety and Quality Policy, as well as regular management safety meetings, which aim to ensure that all safety issues are addressed in a timely and appropriate manner.

### **2.3.2 Training and Reporting Process**

A review of personnel files and training manuals shows that the company has an established training program and scheduled training sessions for all personnel. Additionally, the organization ensures that opportunities for further learning and

professional development are readily available, supporting continuous improvement and competence in safety and operational responsibilities. These training programs are designed and implemented in compliance with regulatory requirements and aligned with the industry's standard best practices.

With regards to training related to safety reporting and emergency protocols, this is integrated into the company's Safety Management System (SMS). As part of the SMS, personnel are trained to identify and report hazards and safety-related occurrences within the operation. These reports can be submitted through various channels, including the company's dedicated online reporting system, which is accessible to all relevant personnel. This system ensures timely reporting and facilitates proactive risk management. Additionally, the Emergency Response Procedures (ERP), as part of SMS implementation requirements, define the processes and protocols to be followed in the event of an occurrence that requires emergency actions or handling, ensuring a structured and coordinated response. To support this, specific training sessions and simulation exercises are conducted to familiarize personnel with the ERP and reinforce their understanding of roles and responsibilities during emergency situations.

However, during the investigation of the occurrence, it was found that despite having a documented ERP in place, the manner in which the situation was handled suggests opportunities for improving coordination and practical familiarity with established emergency response procedures. It was also noted that no practical ERP simulation exercises had been conducted at the station since 2019 (Cebgo ERP manual requires a once-a-year emergency response exercise thru simulation), with reliance placed solely on online recurrent training. The absence of hands-on drills may have contributed to the deficiencies observed in the station's handling of this event, particularly in how they evaluated and reported key safety-related observations regarding the presence of grass on the aircraft tires and tire marks outside the runway's paved surface.

### **2.3.3 Maintenance Program**

The maintenance program for Cebgo's aircraft is carried out by an Approved Maintenance Organization (AMO) operating under the oversight of the company's Engineering and Fleet Management department. A review of maintenance records revealed that the aircraft maintenance schedules for RP-C7284 were consistently followed in accordance with both regulatory and the manufacturer's requirements. An evaluation of the aircraft's flight and maintenance logbooks covering the period from May 2024 up to the date of the incident confirmed that all recorded defects were addressed appropriately and in accordance with approved maintenance procedures. Furthermore, the aircraft was released for that specific flight with no outstanding issues or limitations that could have contributed to the occurrence.

### 3. CONCLUSIONS

#### 3.1 Findings

- 3.1.1** The involved pilots hold a valid pilot license and medical certificates issued by the CAAP.
- 3.1.2** The pilots involved were duly rated for the specific aircraft type and had fulfilled all required training in accordance with both company policies and regulatory standards
- 3.1.3** Review of the pilots' duty schedules revealed no exceedance of flight time limitations or any indications of fatigue that could have contributed to diminished performance or alertness during the flight at the time of the incident.
- 3.1.4** The aircraft has valid Certificates of Airworthiness and Registration.
- 3.1.5** The aircraft was released for flight without any recorded maintenance issues. Likewise, documentation of the aircraft maintenance is available and in proper order.
- 3.1.6** DFDR analysis showed lateral instability during the flight's final approach, attributed to pilot control inputs rather than external factors, as wind conditions were minimal and non-contributory.
- 3.1.7** DFDR data and physical evidence suggest that the aircraft experienced a brief lateral deviation during the landing roll, for which corrective inputs were applied by the flight crew. The recorded brake and rudder inputs indicate active directional control, which does not fully align with the crew's account of an uneventful rollout and complete loss of visibility.
- 3.1.8** Observations of grass on the aircraft tires and tire marks beyond the runway surface were not urgently escalated by ground personnel through the appropriate safety reporting channels. Additionally, the absence of validation by ATC with the involved flight crew regarding the ARFFS report (tire marks outside the runway surface) highlights the need for improved vigilance and sound judgment in assessing irregular observations that may indicate underlying operational risks.
- 3.1.9** Despite having a documented ERP, the airline's station's response reflected limited practical familiarity with emergency procedures. The absence of simulation exercises since 2019, contrary to the annual company requirement, and reliance on



online training may have contributed to the station's handling of this event, particularly in how they evaluated and reported key safety-related observations.

## **3.2 Probable Cause**

### **3.2.1 Primary Cause Factors**

- a. The flight crew failed to maintain directional control of the aircraft after the bounced landing.

### **3.2.2 Contributory Cause Factor**

- a. Pilot-induced oscillation and handling inputs during final approach leading to a firm and bounced landing.
- b. Nighttime operations in marginal weather conditions.

## **4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS**

**4.1** As a result of this investigation, the AAIB proposes the following safety recommendations:

**4.1.1** For the CAAP FSIS to ensure that Cebgo, Inc.:

- a. To reiterate to all flight crew the importance of promptly reporting any safety-related occurrences encountered during flight operations, in accordance with the regulatory requirements and company's safety reporting procedures.
- b. To reinforce flight crew training on manual handling techniques during final approach, particularly during nighttime and marginal weather conditions, emphasizing the avoidance of pilot-induced oscillations (PIO) and the importance of timely and appropriate control inputs.
- c. To consider enhanced simulator scenarios that replicate marginal weather conditions during nighttime operations to improve pilot proficiency in managing aircraft stability during approach and landing.
- d. To review recent occurrences involving lateral instability or firm landings to identify trends and adjust recurrent training programs accordingly.
- e. To ensure that stations review and strengthen internal procedures for evaluating and escalating safety-related observations to ensure timely and appropriate reporting through established safety channels.



- f.** To ensure compliance with the annual ERP simulation exercise requirement at all stations, in accordance with company procedures, to maintain response readiness and reinforce procedural familiarity among all ground personnel.
- g.** To enhance ERP training by incorporating scenario-based, hands-on exercises alongside online modules.

**4.1.2** For the CAAP AANSOO to ensure that Air Traffic Services:

- a.** To review their protocols and, if necessary, enhance their handling of safety reports related to aircraft operations, particularly those that may indicate potential or underlying operational risks.

**-----End-----**